The matches played in the group stage are different from the knockout rounds of any international competition.
In theory, opponents become tougher as you advance to the later stages of any tournament and they also have a better idea of how you have been playing up to that point.
After three games, it is possible to analyze how a team plays with and without the ball with a recent sample, rather than one taken from international friendlies in March and June.
If we take Germany For example, your opponents already know that in possession, Toni Kroos will drop to the left side of the defense to form a 3-1 formation with Robert Andrich In front of him.
From this deep position, Kroos directs Germany’s attacks as they try to find the three number 10s squeezed between the lines. “Playing with Toni, I have the freedom to stay further forward and wait because you know that at some point the ball is going to come,” Ilkay Gundogan recently said The athletic.
“He reads the game, gives us balance with and without the ball, and gives other players like me more freedom to get into dangerous positions.”
Therefore, any team that wants to limit Germany’s threat with the ball and not fall victim to Gündogan, Jamal Musiala, Kai Havertz and Florian WirtzThe intricate combinations of ‘s have to stop the supply from its source.
The round of 16 brought a new contender like Denmark They sought to achieve this by first putting pressure on Germany’s 3-1 lead and then solving the rest of the problems later.
Denmark, out of its 5-4-1 system, focused on pressing Antonio Rudiger, Nico Schlotterbeck and Kroos using Christian Eriksen, Rasmus Hojlund and Andreas Skov Olsenwith Thomas Delaney and Peter-Emile Hojbjerg in zonal roles behind them.
Eriksen had a complex role because he had to drop and support Denmark’s left back and centre-back, but Skov Olsen’s main task without the ball was to suffocate Kroos and not give him time on the ball.
The logical question was how Denmark used five players to press four German players without getting into trouble, because that numerical advantage provided Julian Nagelsmann’s side with a six-versus-five scenario behind Delaney and Hojbjerg.
The first part of the answer was that Denmark’s midfield duo came down to help their centre-backs track Leroy SaneGundogan and Musiala.
Here, Skov Olsen puts pressure on Kroos and Delaney collects the deflected pass, but although he avoids the striker, Hojbjerg advances towards Musiala.
The other was that Denmark’s five defenders effectively changed scores to fend off Germany’s three No. 10s.
In this example, Schlotterbeck finds a step angle towards Gundogan, but Jannik Vestergaard He immediately jumps towards the German captain and Joaquin Andersen moves inside to pick up Havertz.
Gundogan then attempts to throw the ball towards the Arsenal forward, but Andersen intercepts him and begins the counterattack by finding Skov Olsen.
Germany’s impressive start to the game was calmed by Denmark’s organisation off the ball, which also created transitional situations for Kasper Hjulmand’s team. Skov Olsen’s pressure forced Kroos to play safer passes rather than disruptive and occasionally misguided passes.
Denmark’s best chance in the first half came when they won the ball and shot on the counterattack. Here, Eriksen goes deeper to support the left side of the Danish defense, Hojbjerg picks up Gundogan, Skov Olsen puts pressure on Schlotterbeck and Hojlund is in a position to limit Kroos’ time on the ball. This forces the German midfielder to make the quickest pass available towards Musiala and Andersen jumps to put pressure on him.
Musiala tries to find Andrich, but Delaney intercepts the pass to start the counterattack and ends with Manuel Neuer saving a one-on-one situation against Hojlund.
Denmark’s off-the-ball approach limited Germany’s attacking threat in open play, but Nagelsmann’s team have shown they have multiple solutions with the ball.
Due to Eriksen’s complex role out of possession, Rudiger had more time on the ball compared to Schlotterbeck and Kroos and the real Madrid The defender attempted to find Havertz’s run behind the defence on multiple occasions.
Similar to the play in the 2-0 victory against HungaryHavertz attacked the space behind the centre-back as the latter advanced to mark one of Germany’s number 10s.
In this example, Eriksen is deeper than Skov Olsen, allowing Rudiger to have more time on the ball compared to Kroos.
While the center back looks for runners, Havertz attacks the space behind Andreas Christensenwho must watch over Sané. Rudiger’s pass reaches Havertz, but Vestergaard is in the right position to defend this attack.
In another example, Andersen advances to follow Musiala’s positioning between the lines and Havertz intelligently advances into the vacant space in Denmark’s defense.
When Andrich passes the ball to Rudiger, Havertz is in position to attack the space behind Andersen…
…and runs towards that area while being on Vestergaard’s blind side. Rudiger finds him…
…but Havertz’s shot stops him Kasper Schmeichel.
Even though Rudiger’s long passes were a viable attacking option, Germany needed to alter their set-up to ask Denmark different questions.
In the second half, they changed their setup from a 3-1 to a 4-2 with Kroos alongside Andrich and began attacks from deeper positions.
Denmark reacted by putting pressure on Hojbjerg to mark Kroos, but that increased the distance between their midfield and their defensive line, leaving them vulnerable in that area and should they advance, the German centre-backs could play long passes behind the defence.
In this example, Havertz offers himself as a passing option, forcing Denmark’s defence to move forward. Schlotterbeck spots Musiala’s complementary run behind the defence, which is being pulled in two directions, and places the ball into his path, while Sane makes a similar run down the other side.
Musiala’s pass is intercepted by Vestergaard, but Germany manage to win a penalty on this attack after David RaumAndersen’s cross is met with a right-handed save by Havertz, who scores from the penalty spot to give them the lead.
Germany’s second goal came in an identical situation. Here, Hojbjerg and Delaney advance towards Kroos and Emre Can and Musiala drops into the space between the lines, forcing Andersen to follow him.
Musiala then changes direction and makes a run behind the defence, where Schlotterbeck makes the long pass…
…and the Bayern Munich striker puts the ball into the bottom corner to make it 2-0.
In the second half of the first half, Germany struggled on and off the ball, but adjusting their build-up style at the break and switching to a clearer five-man defence without possession with the introduction of Can put them on course for the fourth-finals.
Germany’s individual quality and cohesive style make them a strong candidate to win the tournament; her ability to modify her approach only adds to her strengths.